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I. NACHBAR’S “CONSTITUTIONAL” APPROACH: BANNING  REGULATORY 
RESTRAINTS 
For decades scholars and jurists have disagreed about the ultimate goal 
of antitrust law, what one might call antitrust’s “normative premise.” For 
some, antitrust regulation is simply analogous to Pigouvian externality 
regulation and thus should only ban agreements and other practices that 
reduce overall wealth.1 For others, the Sherman Act serves broader social 
and political values and should, for instance, ban practices that lead to 
undue concentration of wealth and political power.2 Still others have 
articulated a normative premise that is somewhere in between these two, 
contending that the Congress that passed the Sherman Act meant to ban 
those contracts and practices that reduce the welfare of purchasers in the 
relevant market, even if such contracts or practices on balance increase 
economic welfare.3 
 
 
∗  Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor of Law, William and Mary Law 
School. 
1. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 81–89, 
107–115, 405–07 (1993); DONALD TURNER & CARL KAYSEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST 
POLICY, 12 n.11 (1959) (expressly analogizing antitrust regulation to Pigouvian regulation). 
2. See generally David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1219 (1988); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979). 
3. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93–96 (1982) (arguing that legislative 
history of the Sherman Act demonstrates concern with harm to purchasers, not allocative 
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Thomas Nachbar articulates a fourth organizing principle for antitrust, 
what he calls a “Constitutional” approach to the subject.4 In particular, 
Nachbar contends that the Sherman Act mirrors the Constitution’s own 
prohibition on legislative delegation of regulatory authority to private 
parties.5 Using the National Industrial Recovery Act as an example, Nachbar 
claims that delegating the state’s authority to private parties to determine 
the content of regulation deprives regulated individuals and firms of their 
liberty without due process of law, contrary to the Fifth Amendment.6 In the 
same way, he says, courts should read the Sherman Act to ban contracts (and 
other conduct) that restrain individual liberty and thus produce what he 
calls “regulatory harm.”7 
Of course, the Sherman Act does not implement the Due Process 
Clause, which, by its terms, applies only to “state action.”8 While state 
definition and enforcement of property and contract rights is necessary for 
markets to function, the Act is an exercise of the Commerce Power and not 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 Still, Nachbar contends that some 
private conduct can produce the same “regulatory harms” as official 
deprivations of liberty backed by public force and thus is an appropriate 
object for public intervention via legislation.10 More precisely, he draws a 
common sense distinction between economic conduct that is “proprietary,” 
on the one hand, and that which is “regulatory,” on the other. Proprietary 
conduct, he says, entails at its core a firm’s disposition of its own property 
 
 
 
efficiency and total welfare); see also Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should 
Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 661–62 (2010) (describing the “total welfare,” “purchaser 
welfare,” and “populist” schools of antitrust thought). 
4. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57 (2013). 
5. See id. at 88–92. 
6. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (rejecting 
argument by the United States that reliance on private industry to write Codes of Fair 
Competition thereby rendered delegation harmless). Nachbar also invokes the 1935 
Bituminous Coal Act, which the Court also struck down, as exemplifying such an inappropriate 
delegation. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 82–88; see also Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
Similar delegations, it should be noted, took place before the Depression. See Alan J. Meese,  
Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 255 (2013) (describing “codes of fair competition” imposed during the 1920s by 
the Federal Trade Commission after consulting with industry representatives at so-called “trade 
practice conferences”). 
7. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 69. 
8. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
9. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (explaining that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation 
of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the 
action of State officers”); see also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940) (“The 
addition of the words ‘or commerce among the several States’ . . . was the means used to relate 
the prohibited restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional purposes . . . .”). 
10. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 93–95. 
2014] ANTITRUST 117 
 
 
and includes setting the price for such disposition.11 By contrast, regulatory 
conduct entails contracts that by their terms restrict the manner in which 
one’s trading partners deal with their own property.12 A classic example of 
regulatory conduct is a tying contract, whereby the seller of one product 
(the tying product) obtains an agreement from the purchaser to purchase 
an additional, distinct item (the tied product) from the same seller.13 Such 
an agreement, it is said, “regulates” the purchaser’s use of his or her own 
property—including apparently, the money he or she would use to purchase 
the tied product—and thus restricts the purchaser’s freedom of choice with 
respect to property  that the seller of the tying product never owned.14 
Between these two polar opposites, conduct that is plainly proprietary and 
that which is plainly regulatory, stands conduct that shares attributes of both 
and is thus more ambiguous.15 To determine which position on the 
spectrum a restraint occupies, Nachbar says courts should measure the 
“distance” between the “ownership” of a defendant’s property, on the one 
hand, and the control exercised by the restraint.16 
Relying upon this creative taxonomy, Nachbar contends that the 
Sherman Act bans, or should ban, conduct that is sufficiently regulatory as 
to produce “regulatory harm,” whether or not such conduct is inefficient, 
for instance.17 The article also claims that the Sherman Act properly 
declines to ban some  proprietary conduct, such as unilateral monopoly 
pricing, that produces the same allocative harm as cartel price fixing and 
thus would be unlawful under an efficiency standard.18 Failing to ban 
conduct that produces regulatory harm, Nachbar says, leaves firms free to 
engage in private regulation of others’ economic liberty, without the 
legitimizing process of legislative approval. While undeniably private, he 
 
 
 
11. See id. at 96–97. This price, it should be noted, could be infinite, as when a party 
simply refuses to deal with potential buyers altogether. 
12. Id. 
13. See generally IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (evaluating IBM’s 
requirement that purchasers of its adding machines also purchase punch cards needed to 
operate the machine from IBM). 
14. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 100. 
15. For instance, Nachbar recognizes that exclusive dealing agreements are  to  some 
extent regulatory but treats them as less regulatory (and more proprietary) than tying contracts 
because the former, he says, govern products that are “identical” to those sold by the 
manufacturer who seeks and enforces the exclusivity provision. By “identical,” Nachbar 
apparently means occupying the same product market. Thus, an agreement between Ford and 
its dealers that the latter will not sell automobiles made by competing manufacturers governs 
“identical” products. Nachbar does not address, say, a requirement that Ford dealers not sell 
snowmobiles or motorcycles. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 96–97. 
16. Id. at 71. 
17. For instance, Nachbar asserts that most tying contracts imposed by firms with market 
power are efficient but that courts still properly condemn such contracts because they produce 
regulatory harm. See id. at 99. 
18. See id. at 73–74; see also BORK, supra note 1, at 263–79 (treating cartel price fixing as a 
quintessential example of conduct that an efficiency-based standard should condemn). 
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says, such restraints nonetheless restrict private choice and thus liberty in the 
same way as analogous public regulation written by private parties. By 
banning such contracts, then, the Sherman Act, properly interpreted, can 
further constitutional values and enhance individual liberty. Nachbar does 
not deny that, like some public regulation, such “private regulation” can 
enhance the allocation of resources and thus increase total welfare.19 
Nonetheless, he contends that an antitrust regime based solely upon 
efficiency, while maximizing total economic welfare, will not maximize 
personal liberty, a value that competes with efficiency.20 
Nachbar does more than claim that this liberty-based account of 
antitrust is normatively attractive. He also contends that the 
“proprietary/regulatory” taxonomy sheds light on important facets of 
antitrust law that the efficiency and other accounts do not explain. For 
instance, the article claims that only the “proprietary/regulatory” dichotomy 
explains antitrust’s fundamental distinction between unilateral pricing 
decisions, on the one hand, and concerted or collective agreements on 
price, on the other.21 Under current law, of course, unilateral pricing 
decisions are lawful per se, even when a monopolist of a properly-defined 
relevant market protected by barriers to entry sets unreasonable prices that 
gouge consumers.22 By contrast, naked agreements between two or more 
independent units to set prices, whether above or below the market price, 
are always unlawful per se. This is true even if the resulting prices are more 
reasonable than those set by the free market, and even if such price fixing 
might serve important social purposes, such as enhancing the quality of legal 
services for the indigent or improving the quality of bridges.23 According to 
 
 
19. That, after all, was the point of the police power, pursuant to which states abridged 
liberty and property so as to combat market failure and thereby increase total welfare. See 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 & nn.199–201 (1991) 
(arguing that, during the Lochner era, the Supreme Court only sustained abridgements of 
contractual liberty designed to combat market failure). 
20. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 60. 
21. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) 
(holding that purely unilateral conduct cannot violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
articulating the distinction between unilateral and concerted action). 
22. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004) (“[T]he possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) (explaining that antitrust law draws a distinction between using 
market power to charge high prices, on the one hand, and using that power to impose tying 
contracts, on the other), abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink., Inc. 547 
U.S. 28 (2006); Standard Oil Co. of La. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911) (observing that 
the Sherman Act does not forbid “monopoly in the concrete”); see also Arizona v. Maricopa 
Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) (concluding that unilateral price fixing 
between partners is “perfectly proper” despite the resulting elimination of price competition). 
23. See generally FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (banning 
group boycott by court-appointed lawyers for the indigent seeking increased compensation); 
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (rejecting  ethical  rule 
banning competitive bidding without considering concededly possible safety benefits of the 
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Nachbar, efficiency considerations cannot explain such vastly different 
treatment of conduct—supracompetitive prices—that produces the very 
same harm regardless of whether such prices are the result of unilateral fiat 
or collective action.24 Indeed, one might even conclude that unilateral 
pricing by an actual monopolist is more likely to produce allocative harm 
than a randomly-selected horizontal price fixing agreement, the latter of 
which may be between firms that occupy only a small subset of a relevant 
market and, unlike a monopolist, overestimate their ability to affect market 
prices.25 
The article also claims that the proprietary/regulatory distinction offers 
the most robust explanation of antitrust’s disparate treatment of vertical and 
horizontal restraints.26 To be sure, proponents of an exclusive efficiency 
norm would emphasize that a single firm with market power at one level of 
the production process cannot necessarily add to that power by imposing 
restraints on downstream dealers.27 By contrast, horizontal agreements 
combine the market position of two or more previously independent market 
actors and thus pose a greater threat of competitive harm.28 According to 
Nachbar, however, this distinction is completely illusory and has no 
efficiency origins.29  That is, such an analysis ignores the legally constructed 
 
 
 
ban); United States  v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221, 223 (1940) (banning 
horizontal price fixing regardless of reasonableness, rejecting a “reasonable price” defense as 
“wholly alien to a system of free competition,” and condemning defendants’ practices because 
they thwarted “determination . . . of prices by free competition alone”). 
24. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 76. See generally Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and 
Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1212–13 (1969) (equating harm from 
monopoly and oligopoly). Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 467 
(1992) (stating that legal presumptions in the antitrust context should rest on “actual market 
realities” and not formalistic line drawing). 
25. See BORK, supra note 1, at 268–69 (explaining how even a commission-fixing 
agreement between two realtors in New York City is unlawful per se). 
26. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 77; see, e.g. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 47–59 (1977) (holding that vertical non-price intrabrand restraints are properly 
judged under a forgiving rule of reason); id. at 50, n.16, (distinguishing United States v. Topco 
Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), which condemned non-price intrabrand restraints as 
unlawful per se, on the ground that the Topco restraints were horizontal). Compare Catalano v. 
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980), with Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
27. See generally Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) (relying on this argument to conclude that vertical 
intrabrand restraints should be lawful per se, regardless of the manufacturer’s market power). 
28. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.  752, 768–69 
(“Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace 
of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any 
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are 
combining to act as one for their common benefit.”); see also BORK, supra note 1, at 269 
(explaining that once courts define price fixing as unlawful per se, “[v]ery few firms that lack 
power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter into conspiracies to fix prices. 
Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market”). 
29. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 62–63. 
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nature of a single firm’s unilateral ability to exercise market power 
upstream, unmolested by antitrust regulation—a status that itself owes its 
origins to the proprietary/regulatory distinction, and not any efficiency 
considerations.30 Thus, this dichotomy, and not efficiency concerns, explains 
antitrust’s horizontal/vertical distinction. 
Nachbar has offered an original and coherent account of antitrust that 
resonates with values, including liberty and accountability, that any free 
society should foster. To be sure, Nachbar does not attempt a 
comprehensive analysis of the original meaning of the Sherman Act or offer 
criticism of those analyses that have reached different (albeit conflicting) 
conclusions.31 There is, however, some rhetorical support in the Sherman 
Act’s legislative history and other sources for such a “constitutional” 
approach. After all, Senator Sherman decried the “kingly prerogatives” that 
monopolistic combinations conferred on their owners and opined that the 
nation, would “not endure a king as a political power [and] . . . should not 
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the 
necessaries of life.”32 It is thus no surprise that Senator Sherman described 
the bill that he introduced as a “bill of rights and charter of liberty.”33 
Moreover, early case law, including the Standard Oil decision, contains 
language implying that the propensity of an agreement to restrain individual 
liberty was a factor militating in favor of a finding that an agreement violated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. Id. Cf. Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV. 5, 
49–64 (2004) (explaining that so-called “unilateral conduct” in fact is the result of concerted 
action between various economic actors cooperating under the auspices of a legally constructed 
business enterprise). 
31. Cf. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 
(1966) (examining legislative history of the Sherman Act and concluding that Congress meant 
to ban only those restraints and other practices that reduced total economic welfare); see also 
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82–83 (1982) (contending that Congress meant 
to ban all restraints that reduced the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market). 
32. Bork, supra note 30, at 39 (“If we would not submit to an emperor we should not 
submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any 
commodity.” (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman))). 
33. See Nachbar, supra note 4, at 65–66 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (remarks of Sen. 
Sherman)). 
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Section 1.34 One can find apparent references to similar concerns in the pre- 
Sherman Act common law.35 
Moreover, twentieth century case law abounds with statements that the 
Sherman Act protects the “freedom” of private parties from the restraining 
effect of private contracts.36 Consider, for instance, United States v. Topco, a 
decision Nachbar invokes to illustrate how concerns over excessive 
regulatory control motivate much greater scrutiny of horizontal restrictions 
than vertical, regardless of economic harm.37 There, several small grocery 
chains formed a joint venture to manufacture and distribute so-called 
private label goods in competition with large chains who had their own 
private label products.38 The venture assigned each member a territory and 
 
 
 
34. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“The purpose of the 
Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which probably would 
unduly interfere with the free exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage, 
in trade and commerce—in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade.”); Standard Oil 
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51, 57–58 (1911) (concluding that English common 
law, which informed the Sherman Act, prohibited contracts entered “with the intent to do 
wrong to the general public and to limit the right of individuals, thus restraining the free flow of 
commerce and tending to bring about the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were 
considered to be against public policy” (emphasis added)). 
35. See, e.g., Or. Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64, 68 (1873) (“There are two 
principal grounds on which the doctrine is founded, that a contract in restraint of trade is void 
as against public policy. One is, the injury to the public by being deprived of the restricted 
party’s industry; the other is, the injury to the party himself by being precluded from pursuing 
his occupation and thus being prevented from supporting himself and his family.”) 
36. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (banning maximum resale 
price maintenance because the practice “cripple[s] the freedom of traders and thereby 
restrain[s] their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment”) (quoting Kiefer-Stewart 
Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 
(1997); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (condemning quasi exclusive 
dealing contract because it “take[s] away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market”); 
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959) (condemning group 
boycott as unlawful per se because the practice “takes from Klor’s its freedom to buy appliances 
in an open competitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendants’ 
products. It deprives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor’s at the 
same prices and conditions made available to Broadway-Hale, and in some instances forbids 
them from selling to it on any terms whatsoever”). 
37. See Nachbar, supra note 4, at 75 n.56. Specifically, Nachbar argues that: 
[t]oday, horizontal restraints like price fixing and horizontal market allocation 
retain per se treatment regardless of their actual market harm, while no vertical 
restraints are subject to strict per se treatment, and many similar restraints are 
considered unproblematic in purely vertical form but receive much higher scrutiny 
when they appear in horizontal form. 
Id. at 75 (footnotes omitted). Unlike Nachbar, I doubt that Topco is still good law after NCAA v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–04 (1984) (explaining that horizontal 
restrictions in one portion of the market could enhance competition in other portions of the 
market and that such  restrictions  should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason); see also 
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226, 228–29 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(explaining that decisions such as NCAA overruled Topco sub silentio). 
38. Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 225. 
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provided that members would not sell products made or distributed by the 
venture in other members’ territory.39 
The Supreme Court held that the propensity of horizontal territorial 
restraints to overcome free riding and thus enhance interbrand competition 
was not a “redeeming virtue” that could prevent per se condemnation.40 
Simply put, the Court said the Sherman Act was “the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise” and preserved “economic freedom” in the same way that the Bill 
of Rights preserved political freedoms.41 That economic freedom, the Court 
said, included the “freedom to compete,” unrestrained by contracts whereby 
“private citizens or groups” “foreclose[d]” such freedom in one sector of the 
economy so as to “promote greater competition in a more important sector 
of the economy.”42 Any decision to reduce competition in one sector of the 
economy to increase it elsewhere, the Court said, while perfectly legitimate if 
accomplished by Congress (or, presumably a State) could not be made by 
“private forces.”43 Thus, the Topco Court plainly analogized the restraints 
before it to regulation of economic activity by private parties and 
condemned such private “regulation,” consistent with Nachbar’s theory. 
II. A BETTER “CONSTITUTIONAL” APPROACH: HOW REGULATORY RESTRAINTS 
CAN ADVANCE LIBERTY 
Despite this non-trivial rhetorical support for Nachbar’s “constitutional” 
interpretation of the Act, I am skeptical that such an approach can improve 
upon an efficiency-based perspective. In particular, instead of protecting 
and expanding the sort of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, 
Nachbar’s constitutional approach would actually thwart economic liberty, 
particularly the liberty of individuals to cooperate with others in a joint 
enterprise in a manner that improves society’s welfare. 
I am happy to agree with Nachbar that an actual legislative delegation 
of coercive regulatory power to private entities would deprive regulated 
parties of their economic liberty and offend the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Nachbar is to be commended for calling this issue to our 
attention in the antitrust context. After all, even though promulgated by 
private parties, enforcement of such “legislation” via jail time and/or fines 
 
 
39. Id. 
40. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972). 
41. See id. at 610. 
42. See id. It should be noted that the brief of the United States echoed similar themes. For 
instance, the government analogized the restraints before the Court to barriers to entry and 
contended that State-imposed barriers were more legitimate. See Brief for the United States of 
America at 26, United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (No. 70-82). 
43. Topco, 405 U.S. at 611 (“If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one 
portion of the economy for greater competition in another portion, this too is a decision that 
must be made by Congress and not by private forces or by the courts. Private forces are too 
keenly aware of their own interests in making such decisions . . . .”); see also Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341 (1943) (sustaining California’s imposition of cartel-like output restrictions as 
consistent with the Sherman Act and dormant commerce clause). 
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would restrict individual liberty, including liberty of contract, without the 
minimum accoutrement of legislative due process.44 The defendants in 
Schechter Poultry (and, for that matter, their employees and customers) 
learned this the hard way when the United States indicted them on 60 
counts of violating the “Live Poultry Code.” Such violations included, for 
instance, failing to pay minimum wages, allowing employees to exceed 
maximum hours, failing to report prices to the code authority, and allowing 
customers to select individual chickens instead of forcing purchasers to take 
bad chickens with the good.45 A political society that enforced such 
legislation banning harmless cooperation between its citizens at the behest 
of other private parties would too closely resemble the State of Nature that 
man left to protect his liberty and property from arbitrary deprivations by 
brutish force.46 Purely private conduct that works the same deprivation of 
liberty, it would seem, should be just as unlawful. 
I am also happy to agree that private contracts limiting the parties’ 
discretion are just as “private” as private decisions on the content of 
legislation. But there is still a separate question to which, in my view, 
Nachbar gives insufficient attention. That is, do such purely private 
contracts, such as those before the Court in Topco, or tying agreements, or 
naked horizontal price fixing, infringe the “liberty” properly understood of 
the parties to them? Such an infringement, of course, is a necessary 
condition of any analogy to deprivations of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause enforced by the threat of jail or fines. The answer, I think, is “no.” 
Take the agreements in Topco, which the Court (and Nachbar, 
apparently) attributed to “private forces” that restricted the “economic 
freedom” of the Association’s members.47 Certainly a law or regulation that 
dictated where the various members of Topco could sell Topco products 
would restrict the liberty of these members, just as the NIRA codes restricted 
the liberty of the Schechters and others. But what about purely private 
agreements? Do they restrict “economic liberty,” properly understood? 
Looking to the Warren or Burger Courts for an answer to this question is a 
bit like asking the President of PETA for hunting tips. After all, both Courts 
refused to provide  any  protection  for  economic  liberty  against  actual 
 
 
 
44. Cf. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 519 nn. 1, 2 (1935) 
(reporting that the United States indicted the petitioners on 60 counts of violating the “Code of 
Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area in and about the City 
of New York”). 
45. See Meese, supra note 6 (describing Schechter indictment). 
46. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 296 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Assoc’n ed., 2009) (“In 
a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the 
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual 
is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger 
individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government 
which may protect the weak as well as themselves . . . “). 
47. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39. 
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deprivations by the State.48 There is no reason to expect that the Topco Court 
had any appreciation for whatever conception of liberty informed the 
Sherman Act. 
Fortunately, we need not rely solely upon decisions from the 1950s 
through the 1970s. Claims, like Nachbar’s, that the Sherman Act and other 
antitrust statutes protect “liberty” from private restraint, including restraints 
imposed by cartels, are nearly as old as the Sherman Act itself. During 
antitrust’s formative era, defendants often sought shelter for challenged 
practices in liberty of contract or the sanctity of property rights that courts 
were protecting in other contexts.49 Proponents of an expansive reading of 
the Sherman Act or state antitrust laws sometimes responded with liberty- 
based arguments of their own, claiming that the challenged restraints 
themselves infringed on the liberty of others, including parties to them, 
thereby justifying legislative interference with private agreements.50 
The most complete articulation and consideration of such an argument 
can be found in Hopkins v. United States.51 There, the Supreme Court 
evaluated bylaws of the Kansas City Livestock Exchange, horizontal restraints 
prohibiting members from sending telegrams to cattle farmers in other 
states and limiting the numbers and salaries of agents the members could 
employ to solicit consignment sales from such farmers.52 The defendants 
claimed that an antitrust prohibition of such conduct would abridge liberty 
of contract and thus violate the Fifth Amendment.53 In reply, the United 
States claimed that similar limitations imposed by the government would 
abridge private liberty and be void.54 In the same way, the United States said, 
the private bylaw provisions, while creatures of contract, deprived members 
of their liberty to conduct business as they saw fit, burdened the flow of 
cattle from state to state, and thus were direct restraints of interstate 
commerce in violation of the Sherman Act.55 
 
 
48. See generally City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
49. See Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 27, 35 
(1999). 
50. Id. at 34–35. 
51. See Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898). 
52. Id. at 581–82. 
53. See Statement of Case, Brief, & Argument for Appellants at 216–21, Hopkins v. United 
States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (no. 533). 
54. See Brief for the United States at 132, Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) 
(No. 533) (claiming that the challenged restrictions interfered with the “right” of cattlemen to 
sell their products in a competitive market); id. at 188–90 (contending that the challenged 
restrictions deprived rivals of their right to pursue a lawful calling). 
55. See id. at 132, 180–89; see also id. at 190 (“It is the right and privilege of any man to 
engage in the commission business at the Kansas City stock yards, or, having so engaged in that 
business, it is his right to continue. A combination whose efforts are directed to prevent him 
from transacting such business is one which the law will not tolerate.”) (citing The 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq., 101, 127 
(1894); Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q.B. 715 (Eng.)). 
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The Court rejected this argument in a unanimous opinion by Justice 
Peckham. Peckham conceded that statutes imposing similar restrictions on 
freedom of action may well infringe liberty of contract.56 He also conceded 
that such contracts might “greatly restrain[] and limit[]” the autonomy of 
the parties.57 However, he rejected any automatic parallel between the sort 
of public regulation hypothesized by the government, on the one hand, and 
contractual restraints, on the other. After all, he said, the “liberty” of a 
citizen to send as many solicitors as he might wish into another territory 
included the liberty “to curtail that right . . . for what he thinks good 
reason.”58 So long as such agreements were voluntary, he said, the 
agreements found shelter in liberty of contract. This shelter applied no 
matter how much they restrained the autonomy of the parties, unless they 
directly restrained interstate commerce and thus produced the sort of economic 
harm (not regulatory harm) that would justify regulation.59 Applying this 
standard to the restrictions before the Court, Peckham determined that that 
the restraints in question were merely indirect restraints.60 Thus, the 
agreements did not violate the Sherman Act, despite the extent to which 
they restrained the parties’ autonomy.61 
Other formative era  decisions  reached  similar results. For instance, 
when challenging the Addyston Pipe cartel, the United States sought to rebut 
the defendants’ invocation of liberty of contract by analogizing the bid- 
rigging agreement before the Court to the worst form of private control over 
others, namely, human slavery and the sort of “liberty” advocated by Stephen 
Douglas before the Civil War.62 In another unanimous opinion by Peckham, 
 
 
56. See Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 602–03. 
57. Id. at 603. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. at 602–03 (“We say nothing against the constitutional right of each one of the 
defendants and each person doing business at the Kansas City stock yards to send into distant 
States and Territories as many solicitors as the business of each will warrant. This original right 
is not denied or questioned. But cannot the citizen, for what he thinks good reason, contract to 
curtail that right? To say that a State would not have the right to prohibit a defendant from 
employing as many solicitors as he might choose, proves nothing in regard to the right of 
individuals to agree upon that subject in a way which they may think the most conducive to 
their own interests. What a State may do is one thing, and what parties may contract voluntarily to do 
among themselves is quite another thing. The liberty of contract, as referred to in Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, is the liberty of the individual to be free, under certain circumstances, 
from the restraint of legislative control with regard to all his contracts, but the case has no reference 
to the right of individuals to sometimes enter into those voluntary contracts by which their rights and duties 
may properly be measured and defined and in many cases greatly restrained and limited.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Meese, supra note 48, at 43 (explaining that, during the formative era, the 
Supreme Court defined as “direct” only those restraints that produced economic harm in the 
form of prices above the competitive level). 
60. See Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 602. 
61. See id. at 603. 
62. See Points for the U.S. in Reply at 8, Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 
U.S. 211 (1899) (No. 269) (“[The defendants’ argument] suggests the sacred right of self- 
government, contended for by Senator Douglas and described by Mr. Lincoln: ‘The sacred 
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the Court rejected the defendants’ claim that direct restraints of interstate 
commerce found shelter in liberty of contract, noting that such restraints 
could have the same impact on interstate commerce as analogous (direct) 
restraints imposed by states.63 He also determined that the restraints were in 
fact direct. In so doing, he rejected the defendants’ claim that the prices set 
by the cartel were reasonable, invoking factual findings below by William 
Howard Taft, that the restraints had resulted in prices 25% above cost plus a 
reasonable rate of return, with the result that “the effect of the combination 
was to enhance prices beyond a sum which was reasonable.”64 
Responding to claims that the scheme did not reduce the number of 
contracts for pipe, Peckham opined that “[t]otal suppression of the trade in 
the commodity is not necessary in order to render the combination one in 
restraint of trade.”65 It also mattered, he said, that the restraint “restrict[ed] 
the right of each of the members [of the cartel] to transact business in the 
ordinary way.”66 Peckham made it plain, however, that this restriction was 
not problematic because of its impact on personal liberty. Instead, he said, 
the restraint was direct and thus unlawful because of its necessary tendency 
to obtain a “higher price [that] would operate as a direct restraint upon 
trade,”67 thereby implicitly rejecting the government’s analogy between 
cartels and slavery. The ultimate question, he said, “is as to the effect of such 
combination upon the trade in the article, and if that effect be to destroy 
competition and thus advance the price, the combination is one in restraint 
of trade.”68 As in Hopkins, Peckham announced and applied a test for 
antitrust liability that ascribed no independent significance to any 
“regulatory” effect of the challenged contracts, choosing instead to draw a 
line between restraints that exercised market power to the detriment of 
consumers, on the one hand, and those that did not, on the other.69 
As unanimous and nearly contemporary expositions of the Sherman Act 
by a Court particularly jealous of economic liberty, Hopkins and Addyston Pipe 
are certainly some evidence of the appropriate relationship, for antitrust 
purposes,  between  private  contractual  restraints  and  economic  liberty.70 
 
 
 
right of self-government amounts to this, that when two men agree to enslave another no third 
man shall interfere.’ So with [defendants’] sacred liberty of contract. It means that when six 
shops agree with one another to destroy their individual freedom of contract and of 
competition, and to put themselves in slavery to the pool, the [g]overnment cannot interfere.”). 
63. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–30. 
64. Id. at 235–38. 
65. Id. at 244–45. 
66. Id. at 245. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (emphasis added). 
69. See Meese, supra note 48, at 37–42, 73–74, and 76–77 (discussing state supreme court 
and lower federal court decisions evaluating “liberty from contract” arguments). 
70. Shortly before Hopkins, of course, the Court announced, again unanimously, that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects private liberty of contract against 
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Moreover, as a normative matter, the logic of both decisions on this point 
appears entirely sound and would require a different result and rationale in 
Topco. No one compelled any member of Topco to join the association or 
compelled the association to promulgate the licensing provisions that 
effectively granted members exclusive territories. On the contrary, the 
district court found, and the Supreme Court did not dispute, that members 
demanded such territorial exclusivity as a condition of entering the venture 
in the first place.71 The same district court found that there was good reason 
for such demands, namely, without such exclusivity, individual Topco 
members would not be able to capture the benefits of promotional 
investments.72 Absent such investments, the court found  (again without 
contradiction by the Justices) that Topco’s private label products would be 
at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis private label products sold by 
integrated chain stores like Safeway and A & P.73 
Liberty is the absence of coercion, whether perpetrated by the state 
itself or by other members of society.74 The minimum wages imposed by the 
Live Poultry Code interfered with such liberty and thus reduced the 
economic liberty of the Schechters, their employees and potential 
employees, and the firm they owned. By contrast, the intrabrand restraints at 
issue in Topco were the result of a purely voluntary process of negotiation 
between private parties, none of whom coerced other members to 
participate. As a result of this negotiation, each member of the association 
exercised its liberty by agreeing to confine its distribution of the Topco 
product to its own territory, so long as other members of the association 
voluntarily exercised their liberty to do the same. Such bargaining in a low 
transaction-cost setting allowed the Topco members to restructure their 
relationship to avoid the costs of anticipated opportunism—thus preventing 
the emergence of market failure. 
To be sure, such voluntary agreements, if enforced, limited the future 
choices of each member of the association. But as the Supreme Court has 
reminded us for nearly a century, such limitations are in the nature of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
abridgments that exceed the police power. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) 
(Peckham, J.). 
71. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev’d, 405 
U.S. 596 (1972). 
72. See id. at 1040–42. 
73. Id. at 1043 (“[T]he relief which the government here seeks [, voiding the exclusive 
territories,] would not increase competition in Topco private label brands but would 
substantially diminish competition in the supermarket field. The antitrust laws are certainly not 
intended to accomplish such a result. Only the national chains and the other supermarkets who 
compete with Topco members would be benefitted. The consuming public obviously would 
not.”). 
74. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 11–21 (1960). 
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contract.75 Such limitations, if voluntarily entered, do not thereby reduce 
the sort of liberty that a free society values. Moreover, as the Hopkins Court 
recognized, true freedom, whether the freedom to speak, worship, work, or 
marry, includes the freedom to refrain from any of these activities.76 Indeed, 
in the term preceding the Court’s decision in Hopkins, Peckham explained, 
again for a unanimous Court, that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process 
Clauses included the right of persons to enjoy 
all of his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live 
and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, 
to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter 
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to 
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above 
mentioned.77 
Less than a decade later, of course, Peckham would reiterate and 
implement this vision in Lochner v. New York.78 This freedom also extends to 
a firm’s decision to promote and sell a product anywhere the firm might 
wish. Possessing this freedom, the Topco members then agreed to decline to 
exercise it, in return for similar promises by others possessing the same 
freedom. Far from “regulating” anyone, such voluntary agreements were 
instead a straightforward exercise of contractual liberty, an exercise that 
facilitated cooperation with others so as to better accomplish mutually 
beneficial plans, without coercion.79 In the same way, of course, the 
vertically integrated chains employed the institution of contract to prevent 
their employees from selling private label products to rivals.80 
 
 
 
 
75. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–41 (1918) (“Every 
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their 
very essence.”). 
76. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713–17 (1977) (protecting freedom of New 
Hampshire residents not to display “Live Free or Die” on license plates). 
77. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
78. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726 (1963); see also Daniel A. Crane, Lochnerian Antitrust, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 496, 505 
(2005) (“Lochernianism views governmental power—not market power—as the threat to 
contractual liberty that must be checked.”). 
79. See HAYEK, supra note 73, at 208 (“The whole network of rights created by contracts is 
as important a part of our own protected sphere, as much the basis of our plans, as any property 
of our own. The decisive condition for mutually advantageous collaboration between people, 
based on voluntary consent rather than coercion, is that there be many people who can serve 
one’s needs . . . .”). The Topco venture, which association members created de novo, certainly 
satisfied this condition. 
80. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391 (1937) (explaining that 
the business firm is in fact a special form of contract pursuant to which employers are 
authorized to dictate employees actions “within certain limits”); see also, e.g., Ill. Corporate Travel 
Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 724–25 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Employment relations do not 
violate the antitrust laws; Sears may tell the managers of its stores at what price to sell lawn 
mowers.”). 
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Other restraints that Nachbar identifies as producing “regulatory harm” 
are equally voluntary and thus further the liberty of the parties. Take cartel 
agreements, which Nachbar offers as another quintessential example of 
harmful private regulation, given the distance between the property owned 
by each member and the type of regulatory “control” exercised over the 
liberty and property of others. Certainly legislative imposition of prices and 
output would infringe upon the economic liberty of industry participants. 
Indeed, courts once denied states the power to “fix prices” via regulatory 
fiat, unless the industry in question was “affected with a public interest.”81 
However, while courts still call cartel agreements “price fixing,” such 
nomenclature cannot obscure the fact that such agreements are, without 
more, purely voluntary and presumably enhance the joint welfare of the 
parties to them.82 An antitrust policy concerned with these parties’ “liberty” 
then, would seem to require a “hands off” approach to such agreements. 
The same conclusion is true for many tying contracts, even those imposed by 
firms with market power. Nachbar concedes that most such agreements are 
efficient.83 If so, then presumably such agreements, which arise in low 
transaction cost settings, are the result of purely voluntary contractual 
integration, unlike, for example, the coerced block booking imposed by 
Schechter’s Live Poultry Code.84 As a result, enforcement of such restraints, 
like enforcement of the restraints in Topco, will enhance the liberty of the 
parties, who have exercised that liberty in cooperation with others exercising 
their own. It is no surprise then that, during the Lochner era, the Supreme 
Court characterized tying agreements as resulting from “the right of the 
individual to exercise reasonable discretion in respect of his own business 
methods” and read the Federal Trade Commission Act so as not to ban such 
restraints, which it found necessary “[i]f real competition [was] to 
continue.”85 
To be sure, such liberty need not be absolute. Within the “efficiency” 
paradigm, the “right” to agree on price, output or the location of sales ends 
 
 
 
81. Williams v. Standard Oil Co of La., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (quoting Charles Wolff 
Packing Co. v. Ct. of Indus. Relations of Kan., 262 U.S. 522, 631 (1923)) (quotation marks 
omitted) (referring to price regulation as “fix[ing] prices” and declaring such regulation 
unlawful), overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). 
82. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1906 (1988). 
83. See Nachbar, supra note 4, at 99. 
84. See Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of 
Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 67 (1997) (explaining how proponents of tying contracts obtain 
voluntary agreement to efficient ties even when sellers possess market power). 
85. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 428–29 (1920), overruled in part by FTC v. Brown Shoe 
Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1966). Brown Shoe, of course, read the antitrust laws as protecting 
the “freedom” of retailers from voluntary contracts that had no plausible anticompetitive effect. 
Order in Regard to the Alleged Violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 62 F.T.C. 679 
(1963) (finding it irrelevant that challenged agreements governed only one percent of the 
nation’s shoe retailers), aff’d Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316. 
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where a market failure in the form of reduced output and misallocation of 
resources begins. In such circumstances the harm principle justifies 
regulatory intervention to ban such wealth reducing conduct. However, such 
bans do not advance liberty but instead reduce it, all in the name of 
increasing society’s economic welfare. Voluntary restraints that produce no 
harms, by contrast, most likely create benefits, regardless of the extent of 
apparent regulatory control that such restraints might exercise. Indeed, 
overcoming certain market failures requires contracts that act at a great 
distance from the property of the proponent of the agreement.86 As the 
Court held in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the Sherman Act 
leaves unmolested all “normal” or “usual” agreements, banning only those 
that produce the economic consequences of monopoly.87 This decision, and 
the principle it espoused, has been the cornerstone of Section 1 
jurisprudence for over a century. No modern Supreme Court Justice has 
questioned Standard Oil’s correctness.88 Extending the scope of antitrust 
regulation beyond that approved in Standard Oil, Addyston Pipe, and Hopkins 
would further restrict liberty, traditionally defined, and reduce economic 
welfare without any corresponding benefits. 
Far from banning such agreements, a national government that valued 
individual liberty would leave such agreements unmolested and, in addition, 
protect such agreements from abridgment by other sovereigns, including 
individual states. Banning such agreements, by contrast, may thereby invite 
more invasive and less efficient public regulation to combat the same market 
failures. 
III. THE CONTENDING APPROACHES AND CURRENT LAW  
Proponents  of  Nachbar’s  normative  premise  might  respond  that, 
philosophical theorizing to one side, the “proof is in the pudding,” given 
Nachbar’s claim that only a “constitutional” approach can explain key facets 
of antitrust law. If in fact Nachbar’s theory provides the best explanation for 
the content of antitrust doctrine, then perhaps it deserves a second look, 
regardless of whether his account rests upon a normatively attractive 
conception of liberty. However, in my view, one need not rely upon the 
proprietary/regulatory distinction to explain the major facets of antitrust 
law that the article invokes. Moreover, the proprietary/regulatory distinction 
cannot explain certain other facets of antitrust law. 
Take the distinction between unilateral pricing by a monopolist, on the 
one hand, and naked price fixing agreements, on the other. The former is, 
 
 
86. See Meese, supra note 82, at 61–66 (describing three different types of market failures 
that voluntarily obtained tying contracts can overcome). 
87. Namely, higher prices, reduced output or reduced quality. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the 
Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 84–89. 
88. See Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 787 
(2012). 
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without more, lawful per se, no matter how strong the monopoly, how high 
the price, and how much allocative harm results. Moreover, the latter is 
unlawful per se, even if the parties to the agreement have a miniscule 
collective share of a market characterized by easy and free entry, and even if 
the agreement produces no allocative harm (aside from the wasted 
transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing the agreement). Strange as 
this distinction may seem at first blush, there are very sound administrative 
and efficiency reasons for it unrelated to any concerns about regulatory 
harm or the lack thereof. To begin with, any efficiency-based ban on 
monopoly prices would require a court to ascertain whether the challenged 
price is above-cost and thus inefficient at a particular moment in time. 
Moreover, any such determination would be subject to constant revision as 
market conditions bearing upon the efficient price changed. By contrast, an 
outright ban on any and all price fixing agreements requires no such 
reasonable price determination and no continuing regulatory oversight. 
That, as William Howard Taft explained, is one of the virtues of such a per 
se rule, given that the alternative would force judges to “set sail on a sea of 
doubt” and base their determinations of reasonableness upon shifting and 
controversial views of political economy, e.g., whether some industries 
(perhaps those characterized by innovation that produces positive 
externalities) should be entitled to higher returns than others.89 Simply put, 
where unilateral conduct is concerned, there is no apparent legal rule 
analogous to a per se ban on price fixing agreements between two 
independent entities accompanied by integration. Then-Judge Breyer was 
absolutely correct when he explained that, despite its common law 
flexibility, antitrust law simply cannot always force firms to replicate the 
price and output that an omniscient social planner would require.90 
What if, however, courts could costlessly determine the competitive price 
of a monopolist, relying upon this information to sanction those firms that 
had exceeded this price? It is by no means clear that such a regime would 
enhance the allocation of resources compared to the current, conduct- 
driven regime. After all, firms do not obtain monopoly by accident. As Judge 
Learned Hand put it, “no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he 
is doing.”91 Instead, firms acquire such power by engaging in conduct that 
wrests the patronage of consumers from rivals. Sometimes such conduct 
consists of pure “competition on the merits,” such as building a better 
 
 
 
89. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
90. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(“[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws cannot 
precisely replicate the economists’  (sometimes conflicting) views . . . . Rules that seek to 
embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries of 
administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to 
serve.”). 
91. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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mousetrap or realizing economies of scale and underpricing rivals without 
pricing below cost. Sometimes, of course, firms gain monopoly by means of 
unlawful exclusion. But firms rarely gain and maintain such power via 
unlawful exclusion alone. As Herbert Hovenkamp has explained, firms that 
obtain or maintain monopoly unlawfully have generally engaged in much 
welfare-enhancing conduct at the same time.92 The Microsoft case provides a 
perfect example of this phenomenon in two different ways. First, even the 
United States, which would later obtain a judgment against the firm for 
unlawful monpolization, admitted that Microsoft had acquired its monopoly 
by creating and producing a superior product.93 Second, while the courts 
found that Microsoft had maintained its monopoly unlawfully, none 
doubted that the firm had simultaneously engaged in various forms of 
procompetitive conduct, such as vastly improving the quality of its internet 
browser and vigorously encouraging distribution of the same through 
various lawful means, conduct that also tended to maintain the firm’s 
monopoly.94 
As a result, price regulation of a monopolist could be counter- 
productive, especially in those cases in which firms gain or maintain their 
monopoly by means of competition on the merits or other wealth-creating 
conduct, such as efficient non-standard agreements.95 As courts and scholars 
have noted, the lure of monopoly profits can encourage firms to make those 
investments that result in quality improvement, better distribution and/or 
lower costs,  thereby  improving  the  allocation  of  resources.96    Indeed, 
 
 
 
92. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 214 (3d ed. 2005) (“It is usually very difficult for a nondominant firm to become 
dominant simply by doing anticompetitive things. In most cases such firms also have superior 
products or lower costs than their rivals, at least during the period when their monopoly is 
developing.”). 
93. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Brief 
for Appellant United States at 4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (Nos. 95-5037, 95-5039) (“[T]here was no basis for an antitrust challenge to Microsoft’s 
acquisition of monopoly power in the market for operating system software for IBM-compatible 
personal computers . . . .”); Declaration of Kenneth J. Arrow at 11, United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Nos. 95-5037, 95-5039), available at 
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/2517.pdf (“Clearly, the six-fold growth in the installed base 
[of consumers using the Windows Operating System] is primarily the result of the extraordinary 
commercial success of the IBM-compatible PC platform, in which Microsoft’s product 
development and marketing played a part.”). 
94. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (holding that improving a product and giving it away was lawful “competition on the 
merits” despite any exclusionary impact); see also Alan J. Meese, Don’t Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 
9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 761, 776–80 (2001) (explaining how various forms of perfectly lawful 
conduct tended to exclude Netscape and other rivals from the marketplace). 
95. See generally Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 743, 822–27 (2005) (explaining how non-standard agreements including tying and 
exclusive dealing can be procompetitive methods of obtaining or maintaining a monopoly). 
96. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004) (opining that the prospect of obtaining temporary monopoly profits via legitimate 
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Professors Areeda and Turner expressly opined that “competition on the 
merits” should be lawful per se precisely because the prospect of obtaining 
market power incentivized market actors to innovate and reduce costs.97 
What, though, about the  Article’s attempt  to explain the  supposed 
disparate treatment of horizontal and vertical restraints?98 Here again, 
Nachbar’s theory does not improve our explanation of the legal landscape. 
For one thing, there is far less to the “horizontal” and “vertical” distinction 
than meets the eye. To be sure, nearly all vertical restraints are now analyzed 
under the Rule of Reason; ties obtained by firms with market power being 
the only exception. But one can say nearly the same thing for horizontal 
restraints. That is to say, all horizontal restraints are analyzed under the Rule 
of Reason.99  There is but one exception: horizontal restrictions that are 
“naked,” namely reduce rivalry without any prospect of creating redeeming 
virtues. Moreover, there are very good efficiency reasons for treating naked 
horizontal restraints differently from any vertical restraints, as Robert Bork 
explained nearly five decades ago.100 
At the same time, important facets of antitrust law contradict Nachbar’s 
normative premise. For instance, according to Nachbar’s logic, all tying 
contracts should be unlawful per se, because of the great regulatory distance 
 
 
activity provides incentives for firms to exercise “business acumen” in ways that enhances 
consumer welfare); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) 
(explaining that firms obtain the market power supposedly necessary to obtain a tying contract 
because “presumably [the seller’s] product enjoys some justifiable advantage over its 
competitors”), abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 
(2006). 
97. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 707 (1975) (“Moreover, a monopolist whose power was 
legitimately acquired by patents cannot be denied monopoly profits without subverting the 
purpose of the patent laws. Similarly, denying monopoly profits to those whose power was 
obtained by superior skill, foresight, and industry could eliminate the primary incentive to 
develop such competitive skill. Finally, price restrictions would have perverse effects on the 
efficiency and innovation aspects of a monopolist’s on-going performance by eliminating the 
reward.”). 
98. Nachbar, supra note 4, at 97–98. 
99. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999) (holding that 
horizontal restraints imposed by a trade association should be analyzed under the Rule of 
Reason); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–03 (1984) (describing 
various horizontal restraints between member schools that were properly analyzed under the 
Rule of Reason); Chi. Prof’l Sports, LP v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600–01 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that horizontal restriction of output of televised basketball games was properly analyzed under 
the Rule of Reason); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 214 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that horizontal minimum price fixing was ancillary to a valid joint 
venture and thus properly analyzed under the Rule of Reason); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 
Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that horizontal product allocation agreement 
was properly analyzed under the Rule of Reason); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 
85 F. 271, 280–82 (6th Cir. 1898) (describing five different horizontal restraints that are 
properly analyzed under the rule of reason), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
100. See Bork, supra note 26, at 383–84, 397–405 (explaining why naked horizontal 
restraints do not produce any efficiencies and distinguishing such restraints from horizontal 
restraints and vertical restraints that produce efficiencies). 
134 IOWA LAW REVIEW BULLETIN [Vol. 99:115 
 
 
between the tying product, on the one hand, and the control that such 
contracts exercise over the purchaser’s decisions, on the other.101 However, 
that has never (quite) been the law. Even at the height of the inhospitality 
era, the Supreme Court declared that ties obtained by firms without market 
power escaped per se condemnation.102 To be sure, the Court defined 
“market power” quite liberally, equating any departure from perfect 
competition with such power for a few decades.103 However, the Court 
backtracked from this approach over three decades ago, holding that a 
plaintiff seeking to invoke the per se rule must establish what some call 
structural market power, that is, more than mere product differentiation.104 
As the law currently stands, most ties survive per se condemnation, contrary 
to the predictions of Nachbar’s normative premise. 
The same can be said for the sort of “self-regulation” Nachbar’s 
normative vision would seemingly condemn. Take collegiate sports. Such 
competition exists in its current form because of a massive horizontal 
agreement between rivals restricting various forms of competition for 
various sports’ most important input, namely, players. And yet, nearly three 
decades ago, the Supreme Court declared that such restrictions are to be 
analyzed under the Rule of Reason, despite the distance between say, Florida 
State’s athletic program and Colorado State’s, because unbridled rivalry for 
players would result in a market failure, undermine the quality of the 
collegiate    athletic    contests,    and    reduce    competition    with    other 
 
 
 
 
101. See Nachbar, supra note 4, at 99–100; see also id. at 102–03 (contending that the tie in 
Eastman Kodak should have been unlawful even if the buyers had full information before signing 
the contract, despite the resulting absence of market power). In the same way, of course, 
Nachbar contends that all cartels should be unlawful per se, whether or not any member 
possesses ex ante market power or is forced to participate. 
102. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S 1, 5–6 (1958), superseded by statute, 1988 
Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-107, 102 Stat. 4674, as recognized in Tex. 
Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Tex. 1999). The 
author disagrees with the assertion by the Texas Instruments court that the Patent Misuse Reform 
Act in any way undermined the holding of Northern Pacific, as the statute did not purport to alter 
the standards governing tying contracts under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Eastman Kodak v. 
Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1992) (articulating and applying traditional 
tying test without mentioning the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act). For a further discussion of 
the Supreme Court's requirement of proof of market power in tying arrangements during the 
inhospitability era, see Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded 
Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1291, 1334 (2013). 
103. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (holding that the possession of a 
copyright confers economic power for purposes of tying doctrine), abrogated on other grounds by 
Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 
Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that trademark conferred economic power for 
purposes of the per se rule), abrogated by Rick–Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters., 532 F.3d 963 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
104. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), abrogated on other 
grounds by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28; U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 
(1977). 
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entertainment options.105 To be sure, not all such cooperation survives such 
scrutiny. However, the ultimate treatment of such restraints turns upon their 
impact on economic welfare, and not the regulatory distance between 
proponents of such agreements and the parties whose future autonomy they 
limit.106 Courts have reached similar results with respect to horizontal 
restraints imposed by professional sports leagues and trade associations.107 
In short, antitrust law contains no general prohibition against self-regulation 
that takes the form of horizontal restrictions on competitive activities, 
contrary to the predictions of Nachbar’s theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Free societies should protect liberty from both public and private 
infringement. Nachbar is right to consider whether courts could expand 
liberty by banning, under the aegis of the Sherman Act, private restraints 
that contract it. Unfortunately, Nachbar’s proposal to ban restraints that 
produce “regulatory harm” would not accomplish this objective. In 
particular, Nachbar’s methodology for identifying regulatory harm would 
result in judicial condemnation of numerous forms of purely voluntary 
contractual integration. Far from constricting liberty, such agreements 
exercise such freedom, and many also increase economic welfare. Thus, 
Nachbar’s proposal would likely reduce liberty and not expand it. 
None of this is to say that all voluntary restraints should be lawful under 
the Sherman Act. Courts properly condemn certain voluntary agreements, 
such as naked cartels, because they distort the allocation of resources and 
harm third parties. Thus, the line between lawful and unlawful restraints 
does not and should not turn on whether such agreements enhance or 
reduce the autonomy of the parties to them. Instead, following Standard Oil 
v. United States, courts should respect contractual liberty unless the 
challenged agreement unduly restrains commerce by exercising market power, 
distorting the allocation of resources and producing a net reduction in 
economic wealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
105. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–03 (1984). To be 
sure, these rivals operate under a common trademark, but then so did the rivals in Topco, a 
decision Nachbar apparently approves as consistent with his theory. If Topco is correct, then the 
horizontal restraints necessary to keep amateur sports amateur are unlawful per se, contrary to 
NCAA’s express statement to the contrary. 
106. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023–24 (10th Cir. 1998). 
107. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999) (holding that horizontal 
restraints on advertising imposed by a trade association should be analyzed under the Rule of 
Reason); Chi. Prof’l Sports, LP v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600–01 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
horizontal restriction of output of televised basketball games was properly analyzed under the 
Rule of Reason); see also Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918) 
(sustaining as reasonable horizontal limitation on price setting between members of a 
commodities exchange). 
